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Evidence from EuRex vs. EuWax
Abstract
We study option market design by providing a theoretical motivation and comprehensive empir-
ical analysis of two fundamentally di®erent option market structures, the EuRex derivatives exchange
and EuWax, the world's largest market for bank-issued options. These markets exist side-by-side, of-
fering many options with identical or similar characteristics. We motivate the two market structures
based on option investor clienteles which di®er with respect to the probability of selling the option
back to the dealer/issuer before maturity, which in turn a®ects the investors expected transaction
costs. As suggested by the clientele argument, our main empirical ¯nding is that EuWax ask prices
and bid prices are consistently higher than comparable EuRex ask prices and bid prices. The dif-
ference of the bid prices is larger, resulting in smaller EuWax bid-ask spreads, which makes EuWax
preferable for investors with a high probability of early liquidation. We ¯nd that competition from
one market reduces bid-ask spreads in the other market.1. Introduction
In this paper we compare two option markets, the EuRex and EuWax exchanges in Germany, which
exhibit signi¯cant structural and institutional di®erences, yet exist side-by-side o®ering many options
with identical or similar characteristics. While many options in the two markets have similar or
identical payo® functions, they are not exchangeable in the sense that an option position entered in
one market cannot be liquidated in the other market. Furthermore, arbitrage between the two markets
is restricted by the fact that one market, EuWax, does not allow investors to write options, thereby
e®ectively imposing a short-sale constraint. We motivate the existence and structural di®erences
of the two markets using a clientele argument in which option buyers di®er with respect to their
probability of selling the option back to the market maker before maturity. Using a comprehensive
data set of year 2000 market activity, we ¯nd evidence consistent with the predictions based on our
theoretical argument.
An important di®erence between many primary markets, such as stock markets, and derivative
securities markets lies in the fact that, by exercising an option, investors can convert derivative
securities into cash without requiring the liquidity services of a dealer. In particular, buyers with a
high probability of holding the derivative security until maturity may be less concerned with bid-ask
spreads than investors in primary assets such as stocks. The former essentially face only one-way
transaction costs rather than the round-trip transaction costs faced by the latter. Given a choice
between two option markets, investors with a high probability of holding the option until maturity
are best served buying options in the market exhibiting the lowest ask prices irrespective of the
magnitude of the bid-ask spread. On the other hand, investors with a high probability of liquidating
the option position before maturity may be willing to buy a more expensive option, if they expect
to recover the initial ask price di®erence via an even higher bid price di®erence later on.1 Thus, our
clientele argument predicts that one of the two option markets should exhibit consistently higher
ask and bid prices and smaller bid-ask spreads at the same time. Figure 1 provides a graphical
presentation of our argument. One can interpret the two clienteles as hedgers and speculators, with
speculators likely to have higher probabilities of early liquidation than hedgers. While there are
other papers such as Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Leisen and Judd (2000), and
Franke and Weber (2002), who study how investor heterogeneity can give rise to option supply and
demand, they do not connect option clienteles, such as hedgers and speculators, to market design
1 Similar clientele e®ects may exist in bond markets as bonds held until maturity incur only
one-way transaction costs while bonds sold before maturity incur round-trip transaction costs.
3and microstructure issues, as it is done in this paper.
The structural di®erences between EuRex and EuWax are suited to generate the quoting be-
havior predicted by the clientele argument. EuRex is a traditional derivatives exchange, whose
option market shares many (albeit not all) important features with other option exchanges such as
the CBOE. EuRex provides standardized option contracts with a clearinghouse serving as a central
counterparty. EuRex options are traded in an order-driven electronic trading system with multiple
competing market makers. EuWax, the second market in our study, is an exchange which trades secu-
ritized options issued by banks and other ¯nancial institutions. EuWax options are non-standardized,
and individual issuers are free to choose any option characteristics for which they expect investor
demand. At the same time each issuer is the sole counterparty to its own option contracts. However,
issuers compete by issuing similar or identical options and obligate themselves to serve as market
makers for their own products on an organized exchange. It is precisely the absence of a central Eu-
Wax counterparty which enables the market to serve the speculator clientele. Since EuWax options
from di®erent issuers are not exchangeable, and the issuer is the primary market maker, EuWax
issuers can compete based on bid-ask spreads (expected round-trip transaction costs). As argued
above, investors with a high probability of early liquidation may be willing to pay a higher ask price
today at the bene¯t of a higher bid price in the future. EuRex investors on the other hand are
indi®erent as to which market maker initially sells them an option, since it can be sold back to any
other market maker in the future due to the fact that EuRex options have a central counterparty.
Thus, EuRex market makers compete on contemporaneous prices alone, since a EuRex market maker
o®ering consistently high bid prices is not rewarded by being able to charge consistently high ask
prices.
Furthermore, the standardization of EuRex products and the fact that all EuRex market makers
are subject to the same trading regulations (e.g. maximum bid-ask spreads or minimum quote
depths), prevents competition along these dimensions.2 EuWax issuers, on the other hand, compete
directly with each other in choosing option characteristics which maximize demand from investors.
EuWax issuers can potentially trade o® quote competitiveness with other features of market-making
quality such as the aforementioned maximum spreads and minimum depths.
We do not argue that the two markets are necessarily completely segmented. Thus, competition
from one market may also improve liquidity and market-making quality in the other market. In
related work Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2003), De Fountnouvelle, Fishe, and Harris (2003),
Mayhew (2002), and Wang (2000) examine the e®ect of competition among option exchanges of the
2 It is, of course, in the best interest of EuRex exchange management to optimize these design
features for the entire exchange to attract trading volume.
4EuRex type on liquidity and market-making quality. While Mayhew (2002) ¯nds that U.S. exchange-
issued options listed on multiple exchanges have lower e®ective and quoted bid-ask spreads than
single-listed options, Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2003) show that U.S. option exchanges listing
the same options are not fully integrated, in the sense that trades for multiple-listed options frequently
get executed on one exchange at prices that are inferior to those available on other exchanges. Our
paper adds to this literature by providing the ¯rst comprehensive analysis of bank-issued options
along with a comparison to exchange-issued options.
Our empirical results show that there is signi¯cant overlap in the contract o®erings of EuRex
and EuWax. Options in both markets with identical or very similar features for just six heavily traded
underlying assets account for roughly one quarter of all year 2000 equity and equity index option
trading volume in either market. Consistent with the clientele argument, EuWax is shown to have
signi¯cantly smaller quoted percentage bid-ask spreads (by an average of 4.3%). The bid-ask spread
di®erence between EuWax and EuRex manifests itself in a regular fashion in that EuWax ask prices
are consistently higher than comparable EuRex ask prices (by an average of 4.7%). At the same
time EuWax bid prices are consistently higher than comparable EuRex bid prices (by an average
of 9.9%). The di®erence of the bid prices is larger than the di®erence of the ask prices resulting
in smaller EuWax bid-ask spreads. Our empirical results also support the suggested trade-o® for
EuWax options between quote competitiveness and other market-making features. Furthermore, we
also ¯nd evidence that bid-ask spreads in either market are lowered by competition from the other
market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the theoretical
argument regarding option market clienteles and applies it to the EuRex and EuWax option markets.
Data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 contains the empirical results, and Section
5 concludes.
2. Option Market Clienteles
2.1. Heterogeneous Investors, Early Liquidation, and Transaction Costs
The observation that di®erent market structures for options can exist side-by-side while o®ering
products that appear in many regards as substitutes raises the question of the raison d'^ etre of the
di®erent markets. In this section we develop a general theoretical argument based on option market
clienteles and then apply the theoretical insights to generate predictions for the comparison of EuRex
and EuWax in the following section. We wish to capture two potentially important features. First,
we analyze the likelihood of liquidating an option position early before the option's maturity as a
5potential di®erence among option investor clienteles. Such a di®erence may arise for example from
investor heterogeneity with respect to the use of the option (e.g. hedging versus speculation). This
di®erence can be expected to have an impact on an investor's choice of liquidity provider, since it
a®ects whether one-way or round-trip transaction costs have to be paid. The second feature is that
we do not allow investors to write (short) options in one market as is the case on EuWax.
Consider the problem of an investor who wants to buy a European option and chooses between
two markets R and W in a two-period discrete-time setup, where market W does not allow investors
to write options.3 Let AR
t and BR
t stand for market R's ask and bid prices at time t, and let AW
t
and BW
t stand for market W's ask and bid prices at time t. Assume that the value of the option Vt
conforms to the following conditions:
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R


















t for t = T = 2; (3)
where T is the option's expiration date, and It is the option's intrinsic value. Equation (1) states
that in market R, which does not have a short-sale restriction, investors cannot sell the option for
more than its true value nor buy the option for less than its true value. Only the latter condition
holds in market W as stated in equation (2). On the other hand, in market W we allow cases in
which bid prices may be higher than the option's value as investors cannot exploit this apparent
mispricing due to the short-sale constraint. The third condition re°ects that at expiration the option
is worth its intrinsic value. The subsequent analysis is also valid for American options if we impose
the additional assumption that all bid prices will be higher than the intrinsic value before maturity.
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Ask prices in market W cannot be less than bid prices in market R; as this would give rise to an
arbitrage opportunity where investors could write an option in market R resulting in proceeds of BR
and hedge the resulting exposure by buying an option in market W at a cost of AW. On the other
hand, a comparable no-arbitrage condition does not exist in the other direction in the sense that ask
prices in market R can be less than bid prices in market W. Investors cannot exploit such a situation
as it would require writing options in market W, which is not allowed.
Now consider the problem of an investor who has probability P of liquidating the option position
3 Since EuWax options cannot be shorted, the appropriate comparison is for an investor who
wants to buy EuWax options. While precise data are di±cult to obtain, discussions with market
participants indicate that EuRex market makers are on average short in options implying that the
average EuRex option investor is also a buyer.
6at time t = 1. Since the focus is on modelling the investor's transaction costs we assume that this
probability is exogenous. The expected transaction costs (arising from bid-ask spreads) E0[C] of





























where r is a discount rate used to obtain the present value of future transaction costs. The investor





















At time t = 0, an option investor who knows with certainty that the option will be held until maturity
should always purchase the option with the cheaper ask price. If P = 0 for all investors, and if one
ask price is consistently lower than the other, the non-preferred market will eventually vanish or
should not exist at all. The problem is also trivial (choose the option with the lower ask price today)
for the case in which the option with the lower ask price today is also expected to have higher bid
prices in the future. Again, if this condition holds consistently, the non-preferred market should not
exist.
A more interesting case occurs, if one market consistently exhibits higher ask prices and higher
bid prices. In this case an investor with a positive probability of early liquidation may choose an
option with a higher ask price today, if he expects that the option will also have a higher bid price
in the future when the option position is liquidated. All else equal, the likelihood of choosing the
more expensive option today increases with the expected value of the future bid price di®erence, and
with the probability of early liquidation. Rearranging (6) gives a minimum probability P¤ of early













P ¤ divides option buyers into two clienteles. Option buyers with P < P¤ buy options in the
market exhibiting lower ask prices, while option buyers with P > P¤ buy options in the market
exhibiting higher ask prices. Equation (7) also shows that the expected future bid price di®erence
should be higher than today's ask price di®erence. This implication is due to two e®ects. First, the
future bid price di®erence is reduced by the time value of money. Secondly, the expected bid price
di®erence is earned only with probability P while the ask price di®erence is incurred with certainty,
if the more expensive option is purchased today.
While the above explanation does not explicitly address the supply of liquidity/market-making
7services, one can identify situations in which suppliers would prefer to separate clienteles of option
buyers with di®ering probability of liquidation. This would, for example, be the case, if the market
maker's/supplier's hedging costs are lowered by being able to predict the duration of the necessary
hedging program more accurately.4 Based on the above results, the main empirical prediction is
that markets R and W can coexist, if one market consistently exhibits higher ask and higher bid
prices, such that the average bid price di®erence is larger than the average ask price di®erence. It
is interesting to note that the expression for P¤ is independent of the option's value. Thus, our
hypothesis does not predict that the bid-ask spreads in the two markets will necessarily overlap as
depicted in Figure 1. As pointed out above, the short-sale constraint in market W allows for the
possibility that bid prices in market W are higher than ask prices in market R. This latter case is
depicted in Figure 2. An additional empirical prediction is that investors with a high likelihood of
early liquidation also pay more attention to other features of market-making quality a®ecting expected
round-trip transaction costs such as guaranteed maximum bid-ask spreads, which the issuer can trade
o® with current quote competitiveness.
2.2. Market Structures and Clienteles of EuRex and EuWax
In this section we apply the option clientele argument to the EuRex and EuWax markets. We begin
with a description of bank-issued option markets in general and EuWax in particular. Several Euro-
pean and Asian countries have sizable markets of options (also referred to as covered warrants) that
are issued by banks as stand-alone securities. These bank-issued options are traded on organized
exchanges, such as the European Warrant Exchange (EuWax) in Stuttgart, Germany, the NextWar-
rants segment of Euronext, or the MCW segment of the Borsa Italiana in Milan. Bank-issued option
markets are thus quite di®erent from warrant markets in the USA, where the term warrant typically
refers to option securities written on an issuing corporation's own stock. Such U.S. warrants are
originally issued in a bundle with another security (e.g. a corporate bond), but can subsequently be
traded separately.
Almost all bank-issued options are covered options in the sense that the issuer is obligated (as
stated in the prospectus) to hedge all options sold. Thus, bank-issued options are generally considered
to be free of default risk.5 In the prospectus issuers often also commit to make a market for their own
options by quoting ask and bid prices on at least one exchange or electronic information and trading
system (such as Reuter's) until the option's expiration. The quality of the market-making is often
detailed further by providing a maximum bid-ask spread, minimum quote depth, and minimum trade
4 Note that to minimize exposure the market maker should terminate the hedging program, if an
option is purchased back before maturity.
5 In the German market, there are no reported incidents of major defaults on bank-issued options.
8size (number of option contracts) as, for example, in Goldman Sachs (2000). Investors can purchase
bank-issued options using regular brokerage accounts, with orders being ¯lled either on any number
of exchanges listing the desired option or directly with the issuer as an over-the-counter transaction.
However, to the best of our knowledge, it is typically not possible for investors to short bank-issued
options (equivalent to the investor writing the option).6
In addition to competition among issuing banks in the bank-issued option market itself, there
are several cases in which bank-issued option markets exist side-by-side with traditional derivatives
exchanges, often o®ering options with identical or very similar payo® functions. Examples of both
markets existing side-by-side are found in Italy, where the MCW market, for bank-issued options,
and the IDEM market, for exchange-issued options, even exist as segments on the same exchange,
and Germany, where bank-issued options are traded, among other venues, on the aforementioned
EuWax exchange and exchange-issued options are traded on EuRex in Frankfurt.
While precise data for all bank-issued option markets around the world are di±cult to obtain,
the German bank-issued option market is generally considered to be the world's largest. Bank-
issued options in Germany are subject to relatively little regulation, and as a result, banks can
issue options quickly and at low cost.7 The International Warrant Institute (2002), an industry
association, estimates that in the year 2000 roughly half of the global bank-issued option trading
volume (as measured by paid premia) occurred in Germany. EuWax in turn dominates the German
bank-issued option market with a market share of over 90% of all bank-issued option exchange
transactions according to BÄ orse Stuttgart (2001). Although German bank-issued options can trade
on other exchanges such as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, we also refer to them as EuWax options
throughout the paper. For equity and equity index options, year 2000 EuWax trading volume (as
measured by paid premia) represents roughly 30% of year 2000 EuRex trading volume. Thus, the
EuWax market is of considerable size both compared to EuRex and compared to other international
option exchanges. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the trading volume of EuWax
options on the largest underlying, the German DAX index, would rank among the top ¯ve underlying
assets on the CBOE. EuWax is a special market segment of the Stuttgart Stock Exchange, one of
Germany's many regional stock exchanges. Issuers listing EuWax options are required to make
a continuous market for their options and are subject to quality control and regulation from the
exchange. EuWax orders can potentially be placed with any ¯nancial institution willing to make
6 Similarly, Horst and Veld (2002) report that investors cannot short bank-issued options in the
Dutch market.
7 Discussions with Sal. Oppenheim in Germany indicate that the regulatory process for new
bank-issued options in Germany typically takes less than a week, and has direct costs of only a few
thousand Euro. New issues are typically advertised in the business press and via electronic media
which creates additional issuance costs.
9a market. However, discussions with market participants indicate that market-making by someone
other than the issuer is rare and that orders are ¯lled almost exclusively with the issuer's market
maker. All major issuers of bank-issued options in Germany make markets for their own options on
EuWax.8
EuRex ranks by most measures as the world's largest derivatives exchange and has many typical
derivatives exchange characteristics comparable to the CBOE. Option contracts are standardized with
respect to underlying, exercise style, expiration date, and strike prices, and new contracts are created
according to speci¯c rules governing, for example, the addition of strike prices and new expiration
dates. There are pairs of calls and puts for all option contracts. EuRex Clearing AG, a wholly owned
subsidiary of EuRex, serves as the central counterparty and clearinghouse for all contracts. EuRex
has market makers who are obligated to supply bid and ask quotes and to enter into transactions
upon demand generated by an order. There are exchange-mandated maximum bid-ask spreads,
minimum quote depths, and a minimum period for maintaining quotes. Most option contracts have
several competing market makers whose parent institutions in some cases are banks which also issue
EuWax options as shown in EuRex Communications (1999) and EuRex Communications (2002a). A
summary of institutional di®erences between EuRex and EuWax is provided in Table 1. As argued
in the introduction, it is the absence of a central counterparty with competing market makers on
EuWax which allows EuWax issuers to compete based on expected round-trip transaction costs, since
EuWax options are almost exclusively sold back to the issuer. Therefore it is the EuWax market
rather than the EuRex market which should exhibit higher ask and bid prices.
While the predictions from the clientele argument rely only on option investor heterogeneity
with respect to the likelihood of early liquidation, one can interpret the two clienteles further as
hedgers and speculators. It can be argued that hedgers, and in particular institutional investors
with on-going hedging programs, may be more likely to hold option positions until maturity, while
speculators are more likely to liquidate option positions early once the event corresponding to the
investor's information is realized.9
Several stylized facts of the EuWax market are consistent with the idea that it may serve
predominantly speculators with a high likelihood of early liquidation. First, EuWax issuers provide
many more calls than puts at a rate of roughly ¯ve to one, which does not appear to cater to
8 According to BÄ orse Stuttgart (2002), major issuers are BNP Paribas, Citibank, Commerzbank,
Credit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Trinkaus Burkhardt,
HypoVereinsbank, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Rabobank, Salomon Brothers (now part of
Citibank), Sal. Oppenheim, Societe Generale, UBS Warburg, Unicredito Italiano, and WestLB.
9 It appears unreasonable to assume that events will cluster on or shortly before option expiration
dates.
10investors with hedging demands, who are typically long in the underlying asset, and thus need to
buy put options rather than call options.10 Secondly, minimum trade sizes of EuWax options are
considerably smaller than the minimum trades sizes of otherwise comparable EuRex options. This
observation is consistent with the idea that the average speculator may be a smaller investor than the
average hedger, who may be more likely to be an institutional investor.11 Institutional investors with
on-going hedging programs may also prefer the EuRex market due to its superior predictability with
respect to the issuance of future contracts, which is governed by detailed rules for EuRex options,
while EuWax issuers are under no obligation to issue particular types of contracts in the future.
3. Data and Methodology
In the following we describe our data sources, provide a brief overview of market activity on EuRex
and EuWax, and explain the construction of our sample of matching option quotes.
3.1. Data Sources
We obtain data on the characteristics of all equity options and equity index options (hereafter referred
to as index options) which existed during the period 5/1/99 through 10/31/1. These characteristics
are: underlying asset, type (call or put), exercise style (American or European), strike price, expira-
tion date, and contract size (in units of the underlying) for both EuWax and EuRex options, as well
as the issuing bank for EuWax options. The EuWax data are obtained from the EuWax exchange and
OnVista AG, a commercial provider of ¯nancial data with a particular focus on EuWax options, who
in turn obtain the data directly from the issuers.12 OnVista also provides monthly trading volume
statistics for each EuWax option, measured by the number of contracts traded and the paid premia.
In addition, we obtain a complete history of year 2000 bid and ask quotes for all EuWax options
from the EuWax exchange. The quotes are directly recorded from the issuing bank's market maker
via EuWax's electronic limit-control-system. All quotes are time-stamped to the nearest second.
The EuRex option data contain a complete record of all EuRex transactions during the period
5/1/99 through 10/31/1, which is obtained directly from EuRex. In addition to the option charac-
10 O®ering predominantly call options is also consistent with the behavioral ¯nance idea that
individual investors are more likely to have bullish rather than bearish sentiment. Brown and Cli®
(2002) provide empirical evidence on the connection between investor sentiment and asset valuation.
11 Conversations with Sal. Oppenheim and Citibank support the notion that Euwax is predominantly
a retail market.
12 Since all EuWax options are assigned the German equivalent of a CUSIP number, we can easily
merge and compare the two data sources. In a very small number of cases (less than 1%) where the
two sources disagree, we verify the correct information directly from the issuer web site (virtually
all EuWax issuers maintain web sites containing detailed information regarding their own options).
11teristics, these data also contain the number of contracts traded and the transaction price. Thus,
volume data comparable to the OnVista EuWax volume data can be calculated from the EuRex
transactions data.13 For EuRex options, year 2000 quotes are obtained from the capital markets
database (KKMDB) at the University of Karlsruhe. The KKMDB data is recorded directly from
the electronic trading system at the EuRex exchange. KKMDB quotes are time-stamped to one
hundredth of a second. Each record contains the best bid quote and the best ask quote, which are
not necessarily from the same market maker out of the set of competing EuRex market makers.14
3.2. Overview of Market Activity on EuRex and EuWax
Total volume as measured by paid premia of all EuWax equity and index options during the year
2000 is 22.4 billion Euro. The comparable number for EuRex options is 78.3 billion Euro. Thus,
the size of the EuWax market as measured by paid premia is approximately 30% of the size of the
EuRex market.15 By de¯nition, the notional volume of underlying assets represented by transactions
in each market is signi¯cantly larger than the paid premia. For EuRex equity options the ratio of
notional volume to paid premia is roughly ten to one. Hereafter volume always refers to paid premia
and total volume always refers to the sum of equity and equity index option volume unless indicated
otherwise.
As shown in Table 2, there are 37,248 di®erent EuWax equity and index options, where options
with identical characteristics but from di®erent issuers are counted individually, and 67,577 di®erent
EuRex equity and index options during the period 5/1/99 through 10/31/1. As the data show,
EuRex and EuWax option o®erings di®er in several ways. EuWax options are typically long-dated
with average maturities of about 450 and 400 days for calls and puts, respectively, while the average
maturity for EuRex options is about 150 days. EuWax options are predominantly American style,
while index options on EuRex are European style and equity options are American style. There are
also about ¯ve times as many call options (31,116) on EuWax as put options (6,132), while these
are always issued in pairs on EuRex. EuWax o®ers a much larger scope of underlying assets (828
for calls and 431 for puts) compared to EuRex (128 for calls and puts). The number of di®erent
13 To check for accuracy, we aggregate the EuRex volume data for each underlying and compare
them to the volume statistics published in the EuRex annual and monthly reports in EuRex
Communications (2002b). In all cases the numbers aggregated from the transactions record are
within less than .1% of the published number.
14 We also contacted both EuRex and EuWax to inquire about data identifying the type of
counterparty and/or holding period of speci¯c option positions. This type of data would allow
additional tests of di®erent clienteles between the two markets. Unfortunately, such data is
unavailable at present.
15 While the ratio of trading volume in the two markets exhibits some variation over the months in
the sample, there is no discernible trend.
12underlying assets on EuRex is smaller, since it o®ers many more contracts per underlying (264) than
EuWax (38 for calls and 14 for puts). EuRex o®ers both more expiration dates per underlying asset
and a larger number of strike prices per expiration date and underlying asset.
3.3. Matching of EuRex and EuWax Options
For the subsequent empirical analysis we restrict the sample period to the year 2000 and select
all EuWax and EuRex options on six underlying assets: two indices, the German DAX index and
the European Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and four stocks, Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler,
Deutsche Telekom, and Siemens. As a result the sample consists of 5,411 EuRex options and 4,389
EuWax options. DAX and Euro Stoxx 50 options are the most heavily traded EuRex options during
the year 2000, accounting for approximately 46% of EuRex total volume. Options on the four
stocks are among the most heavily traded EuRex equity options during the year 2000 accounting
for approximately 29% of EuRex total volume. Collectively, options on the selected six underlying
assets account for approximately 75% of EuRex total volume. Similarly, EuWax options on the
six underlying assets represent a large share of EuWax trading volume. However, not surprisingly
given the much larger number of underlying assets on EuWax, the share of EuWax total volume
represented by the selected underlying assets is lower at approximately 41%. Comparing between
the two markets, the volume of the selected EuWax options is approximately 15% of the volume of the
selected EuRex options. Comparing the volume of the selected EuWax options to the volume of the
selected EuRex options by underlying, we observe considerable variation. At the low end, Euro Stoxx
50 and Deutsche Telekom EuWax options account for 1% and 6%, respectively, of their corresponding
EuRex options. The percentages are 13%, 14%, and 17% for Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Bank, and
Siemens options. Finally, EuWax DAX option volume represents 28% of its EuRex counterpart. The
EuWax DAX option market is larger than the three smaller EuRex option markets for Deutsche
Bank, Daimler Chrysler and Siemens.
3.3.1 Option Characteristics
The next step is to match EuRex options with competing EuWax options which provide investors
with identical or similar payo® functions. Given that matched options have identical or similar payo®
functions, any di®erences observed should be due to other factors such as transaction costs. We create
three (mutually exclusive) categories of matches that di®er with respect to the required matching
characteristics. All matches have the same underlying asset and option type. Category 1 matches also
have the same strike price, expiration date, and exercise style resulting in identical payo® functions
for both options. Category 2 matches have the same strike price, and exercise style, but the EuWax
expiration date di®ers by § 1 to 7 days from the EuRex expiration date, as small deviations in
13maturity may be perceived similar by investors given the long average maturity of EuWax options
discussed above. Category 3 matches have the same strike price, and the EuWax expiration date
may di®er by § 1 to 7 days from the EuRex expiration date. Furthermore, the exercise style can be
di®erent, but the matches are limited to index call options. Category 3 has the following rationale.
Index options on EuRex are exclusively European style options, while index options on EuWax are
predominantly (although not exclusively) American style options. Since both DAX and Euro Stoxx
50 are total performance indices with reinvestment of dividends, option pricing theory suggests that
it is never optimal to exercise American call options early. Thus, American and European index call
options should have the same value.
In the matching procedure a EuRex option can potentially be matched with several EuWax
options both because slight variations in option characteristics are allowed in categories 2 and 3, and
because there are EuWax options with identical characteristics from di®erent issuers (which count as
individual matched pairs with their EuRex counterpart). However, we enforce a rule such that each
EuWax option is matched with only one EuRex option to achieve the best match quality (smallest
di®erence in expiration dates). Table 3 contains summary statistics of the matching procedure. We
obtain 2,361 matched pairs for 903 unique EuRex options. Thus, only approximately 17% of all
EuRex options in the sample are matched. However, the matched EuRex options account for 32%
of all trading volume among the EuRex options for the six underlying assets, and thus represent
24% of EuRex total volume. Similarly, the matched EuWax options account for 59% of all trading
volume among the EuWax options for the six underlying assets and thus represent 24% of EuWax
total volume. The fact that EuWax trading volume is concentrated in EuWax options with a EuRex
match also implies that the trading volume of the matched EuWax options represents a larger share
of the trading volume of their matching EuRex options than the above mentioned overall (including
matching and non-matching options) average of 15%. This percentage almost doubles to 29%. There
are 199 category 1 matches, 898 category 2 matches, and 1,264 category 3 matches. Not surprisingly
given the general distribution of EuWax options, there are many more call option matches (2,173)
than put option matches (188). The number of matches per underlying asset ranges from 221 for
Deutsche Bank options to 1,010 for DAX options. For almost all underlying assets and option types,
the sample of matches exhibits considerable variation across strike prices and expiration dates.
3.3.2 Option Quotes
For the year 2000, the KKMDB database contains 25,485,590 unique quotes for EuRex options on
the six selected underlying assets. The 903 EuRex options with matching EuWax options account
for 5,041,031 unique quotes or roughly one ¯fth of the total number of quotes. Each of the EuRex
quotes is matched with EuWax quotes. Since some EuRex options have multiple EuWax matches,
14they may have multiple EuWax quote matches as well. For each EuRex quote and corresponding
EuWax option, we ¯nd the most recent EuWax quote posted on the same day. Initially, this results
in 9,699,923 EuRex-EuWax quote pairs. However, it is frequently the case that the same EuWax
quote is matched with several EuRex quotes, because EuRex quotes tend to cluster more in time
than EuWax quotes. In the next step, we therefore retain only one EuRex-EuWax quote pair such
that the time di®erence between quotes is minimized. This yields 3,294,694 quote pairs.
Next, we introduce several ¯lters to eliminate bad quotes and reduce asynchroneity. We elim-
inate all quote pairs with a time di®erence greater than ¯ve minutes (resulting in 3,163,369 quote
pairs), all quote pairs where either ask quote is zero or smaller than the corresponding bid quote
(resulting in 3,156,848 quote pairs), and all quote pairs with a di®erence between the two ask quotes
or the two bid quotes greater than 50% (of the EuRex quote). This results in 3,062,245 quote pairs.
Since match categories 2 and 3 allow for a di®erence in expiration date between the EuRex option
and the matching EuWax option, we exclude all observations for which the EuRex option has less
than two weeks remaining until maturity. This ensures that all options included have at least one
week remaining until maturity, since EuWax options in match categories 2 and 3 can have up to one
week shorter maturity than the corresponding EuRex option. The ¯nal sample contains 2,914,515
quote pairs.
For each quote pair we then compute the following measures: the ratio of EuWax ask to EuRex
ask, the ratio of EuWax bid to EuRex bid, the EuWax and EuRex percentage bid-ask spreads
computed as the ratio of ask and bid di®erence to ask, and the time di®erence between the EuWax
and the EuRex quote. As argued in Section 2, we expect EuWax to have higher ask and higher bid
prices resulting in both ratios being larger than one. In addition, the bid ratio is expected to exceed
the ask ratio due mainly to the fact that the probability of early liquidation can be less than one.
The number of observed quote pairs per day varies markedly over the EuRex-EuWax option matches.
Therefore, we compute daily averages of the above measures for each EuRex-EuWax option match.
This results in a panel of 95,566 daily observations of EuRex-EuWax option matches.
4. Empirical Evidence
We ¯rst provide a detailed univariate comparison of matched EuRex and EuWax options. We then
provide multivariate results and explore alternative explanations to our ¯ndings. Finally, we also
give evidence on whether competition from one market improves liquidity (as measured by bid-ask
spreads) in the other market.
154.1. Univariate Results for EuRex-EuWax Matches
The daily observations are averaged over underlying assets, option type (call or put), and match
category, forming 22 group averages. The resulting univariate statistics are shown in Table 4. The
average time di®erence over all groups is 59 seconds. Irrespective of underlying, option type, or
match category a systematic pattern emerges. EuWax ask quotes are higher than EuRex ask quotes
by an average of 4.7% over all daily observations. Of the 22 per group averages, 20 are signi¯cant at
the 1% level or better and one more is signi¯cant at the 5% level. Among the 21 signi¯cant averages,
19 show EuWax ask prices to be higher than EuRex ask prices. The two cases of EuWax ask prices,
which are signi¯cantly smaller than EuRex ask prices, both have a comparatively small number of
daily observations. EuWax bid quotes are on average 9.9% higher than EuRex bid quotes. Of the
22 per group means, 21 are signi¯cant at the 1% level or better, and all but one show EuWax bid
prices to be higher than EuRex bid prices. For all 19 of the 22 cases, where both EuWax ask and bid
are higher than EuRex ask and bid, the bid price di®erence is signi¯cantly larger than the ask price
di®erence at the 1% level or better. The average di®erence of the bid and ask ratios is 5.2%, which
implies that EuWax bid-ask spreads are smaller than EuRex bid-ask spreads. The EuWax bid-ask
spreads over all daily observations are 2.8%, which compares fairly closely to the 3.2% reported by
Petrella (2001) in a sample of 1,085 Italian bank-issued option quotes, while the spread is 7.1% for
EuRex options. EuWax bid-ask spreads are smaller than EuRex bid-ask spreads in each of the 22
groups with 21 of the bid-ask spread di®erences signi¯cant at the 1% level or better. Since EuWax
options tend to have lower trading volume than EuRex options, the results on bid-ask spreads are
also consistent with results by Cho and Engle (1999) indicating that the negative empirical relation
between volume and bid-ask spreads, which is well supported for primary assets, does not necessarily
apply to option markets.
The univariate results are consistent with the theoretical arguments in Section 2. An investor
who expects to liquidate his option position before the option's expiration may be willing to pay a
higher ask price on EuWax expecting to bene¯t from a higher bid price (and thereby smaller round-
trip transaction costs) when the option position is liquidated in the future. Based on the univariate
statistics we estimate the probability of early liquidation at which EuWax options become preferable
(ignoring time value of money and assuming that the current bid price di®erence is equal to the
expected future bid price di®erence). The implied probability averages 47% with a maximum of
62%.16 Given the long maturity of many EuWax options, it appears plausible that a speculator may
have a probability of early liquidation in the range of the reported implied values.
16 For each group, the probability is calculated as average ask ratio minus one divided by average
bid ratio minus one.
16Next we investigate whether the relation indicated by the averages above holds consistently for
many quotes. To do this, we categorize each of the 2,914,515 matching quote pairs based on the
relation among the ask and bid quotes. To reduce the number of cases, we ignore quote pairs in
which the comparable bid and/or ask are equal. This eliminates fewer than 1% of all quote pairs and
leaves us with four cases:




















For each case, we then compute the average ask and bid ratios for di®erent underlyings, option type
(call or put), and match category.
Table 5 shows that the previous results hold consistently as case 1 is the most frequent. Averaged
over all underlyings, types, and match categories, the share of quote pairs exhibiting both higher
EuWax ask prices as well as higher EuWax bid prices is 61%. Over the 22 groups, the share of such
quote pairs ranges from 22% to 88%. The average ask price di®erence in this relation is 7%, while the
average bid price di®erence is 12%. Case 1 allows for situations in which EuWax bid prices exceed
EuRex ask prices. However, as pointed out previously, investors are unable to arbitrage such cases
due to the inability to short EuWax options.
The next largest average share of quote pairs is 31% for case 2 in which the EuWax ask price
is lower than the EuRex ask price and the EuWax bid price is higher than the EuRex bid price.
This relation (if maintained over the life of the option) would render EuWax options preferable for
all investors regardless of their likelihood of early liquidation. Over the 22 groups, the share of such
cases ranges from 11% to 60%. In this situation, EuWax ask prices are on average 3% cheaper than
EuRex ask prices and EuWax bid prices are on average 6% higher than EuRex bid prices. Combining
the above two cases, in which EuWax options appear preferable to option investors with a positive
probability of early liquidation, accounts on average for approximately 92% of all observed quote
pairs.
Case 3 in which both the EuWax bid and ask quote are smaller than their EuRex counterpart
accounts on average for 7% of quote pairs. Over the 22 groups, the share of case 3 ranges from 0%
to 26%. In this case, the EuWax ask price is on average lower by 7%, while the EuWax bid price is
only lower by on average 5%. In case 3, an investor expecting early liquidation will prefer EuWax
options, if the savings from the lower ask price are larger than the expected loss from the lower bid
price. Again assuming the relations are maintained over the life of the option, this is the case for 19
17of the 22 groups for which the ask price di®erence is larger than the bid price di®erence. Even for
the remaining three groups an investor might still prefer EuWax options as long as the probability of
early liquidation is not equal to one. Case 3 potentially includes situations in which EuRex bid prices
exceed EuWax ask prices for options with identical payo® functions. Ignoring other transaction costs,
such situations could constitute potential arbitrage opportunities, as investors are able to write (i.e.
short) EuRex options. We ¯nd that the potential arbitrage case of AW < BR occurs in less than 1%
of the 2,914,515 quote pairs in the sample and that the median di®erence of the two prices is less than
2.5%. Many of the potential arbitrage quote pairs may be due to asynchroneity, which is con¯rmed
by the fact that the mean time di®erence is around 3 minutes (as compared to 59 seconds for the
entire sample). Finally, the relation of a higher EuWax ask price and a lower EuWax bid price (case
4), which, if maintained, would make EuRex options preferable for all investors, on average accounts
for only 1% of the observed quote pairs. Over the 22 groups, this share is never larger than 3%.
4.2. Multivariate Results for EuRex-EuWax Matches
4.2.1 Ask Ratios
In this section we investigate how the competitiveness of EuWax options relative to EuRex options
varies in our sample. A natural measure of relative competitiveness is the ratio of ask prices, since
it a®ects all option buyers irrespective of the likelihood of early liquidation. For this analysis we use
the 2,914,515 matched quote pairs described in Section 3.3. For each EuWax option in the matched
data set, we calculate monthly averages of all variables which results in an unbalanced panel of 8,185
monthly observations for the 2,361 EuWax options with EuRex matches. We use monthly rather
than the previously employed daily averages for two main reasons. First, most of the variables used
in the subsequent analysis exhibit relatively little time-series variation. Secondly, employing a lower
frequency reduces the problem of potential serial correlation in the ask and bid ratio measures.
Summary statistics for the panel are shown in Table 6. Each monthly observation of ask and bid
ratios is based on an average of 355 quotes with a standard deviation of 628 quotes. The average ask
ratio is around 1.05, and the average bid ratio is around 1.09. The average number of EuWax options
competing with each other and the matching EuRex option is 2.7; the maximum is 8 competing
EuWax options. The ratio of EuWax minimum trade size (in units of the underlying asset) to EuRex
minimum trade size averages 2.6% with a standard deviation of 5.7% and a maximum of 50%. The
guaranteed maximum bid-ask spread (in Euro) averages 17 cents for EuWax options with a standard
deviation of 50 cents. We create a dummy equal to one, if the issuing institution of a EuWax option
is also a market maker for the matching EuRex option. This is the case for 59% of all EuRex-EuWax
pairs.
18We compute the annualized standard deviation of the underlying asset's daily returns during
the observation month. Daily return and price information for the underlying assets is obtained from
Datastream. The standard deviation averages 32% and ranges from 11% to 77%. For each option
pair we compute daily time to expiration (in days) using the expiration date of the EuRex option, and
moneyness (ratio of underlying asset price to strike price for calls; ratio of strike price to underlying
asset price for puts) using the underlying asset's closing price. The daily values are averaged for each
observation month. Time to expiration averages 221 days with a standard deviation of 155 days and
ranges from 14 days to 730 days. Moneyness averages 102% with a standard deviation of 26% and
ranges from 37% to 347%.
We employ three regression speci¯cations using the EuWax to EuRex ask ratio as the dependent
variable. The following independent variables are present in all speci¯cations: EuWax to EuRex bid
ratio, and number of competing EuWax options. Based on the clientele argument, the bid ratio
should have a positive coe±cient, which should, however, be smaller than one, given that the average
investor's probability of early liquidation is also expected to be smaller than one. The number of
competing EuWax options is expected to have a negative e®ect on the ask ratio based on the idea
that increased competition should drive down option investors' transaction costs. Underlying asset
standard deviation, option type (dummy equal to one for puts), moneyness, and time to expiration
are used as control variables in all speci¯cations. In addition to the above variables, speci¯cation
1 also contains a EuRex market maker dummy. If the EuRex market is one of the venues used by
EuWax issuers to actually hedge their own exposures from selling EuWax options, it could be argued
that issuers which are also EuRex market makers in the same underlying asset may enjoy hedging
cost advantages. If these hedging cost advantages are passed on to EuWax option buyers, there
should be a negative coe±cient. In speci¯cation 2, we include dummy variables for the underlying
assets and EuWax issuers. The dummies are designed such that the regular intercept represents
DAX EuWax options (the largest EuWax segment) issued by Citibank (the largest EuWax issuer).
The market maker dummy is excluded from speci¯cation 2, since it is perfectly correlated with the
issuer dummy in several cases. Speci¯cation 3 adds the EuWax issuer's guaranteed maximum bid-ask
spread and the ratio of EuWax to EuRex minimum trade size to speci¯cation 2. One can expect
negative coe±cients for both variables. Investors wishing to liquidate early should prefer a lower
maximum guaranteed bid-ask spread, since it ceteris paribus increases the expected future bid price.
If EuWax issuer are compensated for this guarantee they should be able to charge higher ask prices.
Secondly, if EuWax investors are on average smaller investors than EuRex investors, they prefer
smaller minimum trade sizes, which again allows the EuWax issuer to raise its ask price all else
equal. These last two variables are only available for a subset of EuWax options which reduces the
19sample to 3,801 monthly observations.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 7. All standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and ¯rst-order serial correlation. Since most coe±cient estimates appear to be con-
sistent across the three speci¯cations, we combine the discussion. As expected the coe±cient for the
bid ratio is positive, less than one at approximately .7, and signi¯cant, indicating that EuWax option
buyers paying higher relative ask prices can expect to be compensated via even higher relative bid
prices.17 The coe±cient for the number of competing EuWax options is negative and signi¯cant,
which is consistent with the idea that competition among EuWax issuers drives down the transaction
costs to EuWax option buyers. The coe±cient for the underlying asset standard deviation is negative
and signi¯cant. Given that this result also holds in the speci¯cations that include underlying asset
dummies, we interpret this result as an indication that, relative to EuRex options, EuWax liquidity
is less a®ected in periods of higher uncertainty. Time to expiration is negative and signi¯cant in
the ¯rst two speci¯cations, but switches sign and becomes insigni¯cant in speci¯cation 3. The put
dummy coe±cient is negative and signi¯cant at the 10% level or better in all regressions. Moneyness
has a positive coe±cient, but is only marginally signi¯cant in one speci¯cation. We also run each
speci¯cation (results not shown) with moneyness and moneyness squared to investigate potential
non-linear e®ects of moneyness but we do not ¯nd any signi¯cant coe±cients. The market maker
dummy coe±cient has the predicted negative sign, but is insigni¯cant. On the other hand both the
maximum bid-ask spread and the relative minimum trade size coe±cients have the predicted negative
sign and are signi¯cant lending further support to the clientele argument in the sense that EuWax
issuers can trade o® more competitive quotes (lower ask ratios) for other market-making features
that are important to the EuWax clientele.
Relative to DAX options several other underlying assets have signi¯cantly lower ask ratios:
Deutsche Bank options and Deutsche Telekom options in speci¯cations 2 and 3, Euro Stoxx 50
options in speci¯cation 3 only. Interestingly, there also appears to be considerable variation in ask
ratios across issuers relative to the market leader Citibank. BNP Paribas, and Sal. Oppenheim
are cheaper in both speci¯cations, while Dresdner Bank, UBS Warburg, and Unicredito Italiano are
cheaper in speci¯cation 2 only. Credit Lyonnais, Commerzbank, DG Bank, Rabobank, and Societe
Generale are more expensive in both speci¯cations, while Merrill Lynch and West LB are more
expensive in speci¯cation 3 only.18 Adjusted ¯t lies between 73% and 75% for the three speci¯cations.
17 There are potential endogeneity problems using the bid ratio as a regressor. Thus we repeat
speci¯cation 3 excluding the bid ratio With the exception of relative minimum trade size, all
signi¯cant variables from the orginal speci¯cation 3 maintain sign and signi¯cance.
18 A potential explanation of signi¯cant issuer dummies could be variation in issuer default risk.
However, an analysis (results not shown) of a potential link between issuer dummies and accounting
20An additional test of the clientele argument can be based on the time-series properties of ask
ratios. The idea is that as a particular option approaches maturity, the probability of holding to
expiration increases and the probability of liquidating before expiration decreases. Therefore the
incentive to pay a higher ask price in the EuWax market decreases, and we should expect the ask
ratio to decrease over time. While the results in the above regressions are inconclusive with respect
to time to expiration, they su®er from the problem that the estimated coe±cient measures both
cross-sectional as well as time-series variation in time to expiration. To produce a cleaner test of
the time-series e®ects alone, we split the sample by EuRex expiration dates thereby eliminating any
cross-sectional variation in time to expiration. To ensure that all time series are available over the
full year 2000 sample period we focus on options expiring in 2001 and 2002 resulting in seven di®erent
expiration date samples. We eliminate two expiration dates as their samples contain fewer than 20
monthly observations. The remaining ¯ve expiration dates range from March 2001 to June 2002 with
sample sizes ranging from 255 to 1,491 observations. We then estimate the above three regression
speci¯cations for each of the ¯ve expiration date samples. The coe±cient on time to expiration in
these regressions measures time-series variation only and is expected to be positive based on our
argument. Table 8 shows the estimated coe±cients and t-statistics for time to expiration. Estimated
coe±cients for the remaining variables are not shown but are generally consistent with the previous
results. As expected all but one of the 15 coe±cients on time to expiration are positive and signi¯cant
at the 1% level or better. Based on the estimated coe±cients, the table also shows the decrease in
the ask ratio as the options age by one month. This monthly decrease ranges from 20 to 93 basis
points and thus also appears to be economically signi¯cant.
4.2.2 Probability of Early Liquidation
As pointed out in the univariate results, we can use the observed ask ratios and bid ratios to construct
a measure of the probability of early liquidation at which investors are divided into EuRex and EuWax
clients. The interpretation of this measure is such that all investors with a higher probability than
this cut-o® value select EuWax, while all investors with a lower probability than this cut-o® value
select EuRex. We construct the probability of early liquidation cut-o® (PELC) as follows.
PELC =
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for BR > AR > 1
for AR > BR > 1
for AR > 1 > BR
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(9)
where AR is the ratio of EuWax ask to EuRex ask and BR is the ratio of EuWax bid to EuRex
measures of ¯nancial strength/leverage/default risk does not reveal any signi¯cant results.
21bid. As shown by the univariate results, the ¯rst case in the above equation is by far the most
frequent, where EuWax ask and bid prices are higher with the bid price di®erence being larger than
the ask price di®erence. The next four cases are situations where either all investors irrespective of
their probability of early liquidation prefer EuRex and we set the cut-o® value to one or all investors
irrespective of their probability of early liquidation prefer EuWax and we set the cut-o® value equal
to zero. The last case has both lower bid and ask prices on EuWax. In this situation investors
initially save money by buying EuWax options, but may loose even more money later on, if the
option is liquidated. However, the initial savings are certain while the losses are only incurred with
the probability of early liquidation. Unlike case 1, it would be investors with a probability of early
liquidation below rather than above a certain threshold who prefer EuWax in this last case. The
last case represents fewer than .05% of our monthly observations, and we thus exclude it from the
empirical analysis as it is unclear how to combine its PELC measure with the other cases. We
compute the PELC measure for each observation in the monthly data set using the monthly ask
ratios and bid ratios. The average PELC value is 36% with a standard deviation of 29%. As before
the PELC measure incorporates two simpli¯cations in that it ignores the e®ect of the time value of
money on the probability of early liquidation. Furthermore, it uses the current bid ratio as a measure
of the investor's expected bid ratio.
Based on the clientele argument our main hypothesis is that options which attract investors
with speculative motives will exhibit higher probabilities of early liquidation as measured by the
PELC values. We employ two measures of speculativeness. The ¯rst measure is the option's omega
commonly used by practitioners.
Omega = ¢ £
S
AW (10)
where ¢ is the option's delta, S is the value of the underlying, and AW is the EuWax ask price. It is
often argued that options with high omegas are attractive to investors with speculative motives, since
omega measures the elasticity of option prices with respect to the value of the underlying. Therefore
omega measures the return leverage of an option position rather than the price leverage which is




Options with high vegas are attractive to investors with speculative motives regarding the underlying
asset's volatility. Similar to our choice of omega rather than delta, we use the ratio of vega to the
option's price rather than vega itself. The vega ratio can be interpreted as the option's percentage
price change given a one percent change in the underlying asset's standard deviation. For European
EuWax options delta and vega are computed using the option pricing formulas with continuous divi-
dend yields as derived by Merton (1973). For American EuWax options delta and vega are computed
22using the analytic approximation as derived by Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987).19 Omegas and
vega ratios are computed daily, and then averaged for each month in the sample. We regress the
probability of early liquidation measure (PELC) on both measures of speculativeness using EuWax
market share, computed as the ratio of EuWax option monthly trading volume to the sum of EuWax
and EuRex option monthly trading volume, time to expiration, and option type as control variables.20
To illustrate why we control for variation in market share between EuRex and EuWax consider the
case in which EuWax issuers incorrectly set ask and bid prices such that PELC values are very high
for an option which is not attractive to speculators as measured by omega and vega ratio. The result
will be that very few investors purchase EuWax options and the market share of EuWax will be
small. The results of the regression are shown in Table 9. As predicted by the clientele argument
there is a positive relation between the probability of early liquidation as measured by PELC and
both measures of speculativeness, omega and vega ratio. We also observe a positive relation be-
tween the PELC measure and time to expiration. As argued previously, all else equal the probability
of early liquidation should increase with time to expiration consistent with the positive coe±cient.
The market share coe±cient is negative but insigni¯cant. The coe±cient for option type is negative
indicating a lower PELC measure for put options. Adjusted ¯t for the regression is 19.2%.
4.3. Alternative Explanations
The clientele argument suggests that investors with a high probability of early liquidation are willing
to pay higher EuWax ask prices to bene¯t from lower round-trip transaction costs (as measured by
bid-ask spreads) for EuWax options. In the following, we evaluate potential alternative explanations
for our ¯ndings.
4.3.1 E®ective Spreads vs. Quoted Spreads
Our analysis is based on a comparison of quotes rather than transactions due to the unavailability of
large-scale transaction data for EuWax options. While we ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in quoted bid-ask
spreads between the two markets, it is possible that the same relation does not hold for e®ective bid-
ask spreads if, for example, transactions inside the quoted spread are more frequent on EuRex than on
EuWax. The following analysis investigates this issue. A sample of time-stamped transaction prices
19 For each month in the sample we use risk-free discount rates published by the European
Central Bank. We employ historic dividend yields during the year 2000 obtained from OnVista
AG. Standard deviations are year 2000 averages of the monthly standard deviations used in the
preceeding regressions.
20 The market share measure is adjusted for di®erences between EuWax and EuRex in the number
of trading days during the month.
23is provided by the EuWax exchange.21 We select transaction prices of EuWax options with matching
EuRex options as de¯ned previously. Each EuWax transaction is matched with a corresponding
EuRex transaction provided that the time di®erence between the two is less than one hour. Next
each transaction is matched with the immediately preceding quote from each respective market such
that the quote is no more than ten minutes before the corresponding transaction. We then compute
quoted bid-ask spreads as de¯ned previously and e®ective bid-ask spreads EFF de¯ned as:
EFF =
2 £ jP ¡ Mj
A
; (12)
where P is the transaction price, M is the average of the corresponding bid and ask quotes, and A
is the corresponding ask quote. We also record the share of all transactions taking place inside the
spread. As before, we form groups by underlying, option type (call or put), and match category, and
compute averages which are reported in Table 10. We exclude groups with fewer than ten observations
leaving us with 1,261 observations in eleven groups. The results indicate that the incidence of inside-
quote transactions is indeed higher on EuRex than on EuWax, with averages over all groups of 72.2%
and 21.3%, respectively. This higher incidence of inside-quote transactions translates into a larger
di®erence between quoted spreads and e®ective spreads on EuRex compared to EuWax. Average
quoted and e®ective spreads on EuRex are 8.3% and 4.4%, respectively, while they are 3.6% and
2.6%, respectively, for EuWax. Thus, the di®erence between bid-ask spreads on EuRex and EuWax
shrinks when measured by e®ective spreads. However, over all groups the di®erence in e®ective
spreads of 1.8% is still signi¯cant at the 1% level indicating that EuRex-EuWax di®erences still
persist when measured via e®ective spreads..
4.3.2 Liquidity Premium
Chan and Pinder (2000) use a sample of 252 matched trades of Australian bank-issued equity options
and exchange-issued equity options. They ¯nd that bank-issued options have on average higher
transaction prices than comparable exchange-issued options and argue that the di®erence may be
due to a liquidity premium for bank-issued options. This liquidity premium is motivated by the
fact that Australian bank-issued options in the sample are electronically traded as opposed to °oor
trading for exchange-issued options, which Chan and Pinder (2000) argue leads to faster execution
and better transparency for bank-issued options. Furthermore, bank-issued options in their sample
tend to have larger trading volume than comparable exchange-issued options. It is di±cult to see
how similar arguments of a liquidity premium could be applied to the EuRex-EuWax comparison.
While we do not have direct evidence on speed of execution, the exchange-issued EuRex market
21 For each day and option EuWax keeps the last entry in its real-time database in a second
database of historic records. Most of the time this last entry is a quote rather than a transaction
and thus we cannot use it for the analysis leading to the small sample size.
24is an electronic market, while the bank-issued market uses order-book brokers without automated
matching. More importantly, the monthly trading volume of EuWax options is larger than the
monthly trading volume of matching EuRex options in only 17% of the observations.
4.3.3 Bid-Ask Spreads vs. Other Transaction Costs
Another potential reason why investors may be willing to pay higher EuWax ask prices, is that
transaction costs unrelated to bid-ask spreads may be lower for bank-issued options. Horst and Veld
(2002) compare transaction costs for Dutch bank-issued options and exchange-issued options, and
¯nd economically signi¯cant transaction cost advantages only in the case of very low-priced (· :2
Euro) bank-issued options.22 To investigate the issue of transaction cost di®erences unrelated to
bid-ask spreads, we perform the following analysis for the German markets using DAX options.23
We obtain detailed pricing schedules from three large German on-line brokerages which o®er both
EuWax and EuRex trading: Comdirect (owned by Commerzbank), Consors (owned by BNP Paribas),
and Fimatex (majority owned by Societe Generale). In the case of Consors, the comparison is
relatively straightforward as both EuWax and EuRex option trades are charged as a percentage of
the transaction value (in addition to a °at charge for each trade). The EuWax charge of .25% is
half of the EuRex charge of .50%. Comdirect and Fimatex charge EuWax options primarily through
a percentage (in addition to a °at fee), while EuRex options are charged per contract. Thus the
transaction cost di®erence depends on the value of the option.
To generate a range of typical option trade values, we ¯rst set the EuWax contract size to
.01 Euro per index point which is the most common contract size representing 80% of the EuWax
DAX options in the sample of EuRex-EuWax pairs. EuRex DAX options have a contract size of 5
Euro per index point. For each EuWax option with .01 Euro contract size, we compute the average
ask price over all EuRex-EuWax quote pairs in the sample. Next, we analyze the cross-sectional
variation of the ask prices. Over all EuWax options the mean and median ask price is 7.66 and 4.76
Euro, respectively. In addition, we use the top and bottom decile ask prices of 19.01 and 1.05 Euro,
respectively. For each of the four option prices, we compute three trade values corresponding to 1, 10,
and 100 EuRex contracts. Finally, we calculate the transaction costs for each of the resulting twelve
trade values under each brokerage's pricing schedule. The results are shown in Table 11. While
transaction costs for EuWax option trades are generally lower than transaction costs for EuRex
options, with the exception of the smallest trade for the lowest-price option, all transaction cost
22 For bank-issued options with prices of .5 Euro or above, the transaction cost advantage is never
larger than .9% of the option value, and there are several cases in which exchange-issued options
have lower transaction costs.
23 A similar analysis (not shown) for the other underlying assets yields comparable results.
25di®erences are less than 1% of the trade value. Thus, it is unlikely that transaction cost di®erences
could be responsible for the observed di®erences in bid and ask prices across the two markets.
4.4. Options with and without Competition from the other Market
While the univariate and multivariate results lend support to the suggested clientele argument, the
EuRex and EuWax option markets may not be fully segmented. If investors are willing to switch
between the two markets, we would expect that the competitive pressure from the other market will
positively a®ect liquidity relative to options in each market which are not subject to competition
from the other market. We investigate this issue using bid-ask spreads as a measure of liquidity.
4.4.1 E®ect of EuWax Competition on EuRex Bid-Ask Spreads
For each of the 903 EuRex options, which have at least one competing EuWax option, we ¯nd
matching EuRex options which at no point during the sample period have a competing EuWax
option. We require that the matching EuRex option has the same underlying and type. From the
eligible EuRex options without EuWax competition, each month the one with average daily trading
volume closest to the average daily trading volume of the EuRex option (with EuWax competition)
is selected.24 Although the previous results indicate that there may not be a strong relation between
trading volume and bid-ask spreads, we nonetheless conform to this matching procedure, since it is,
for example, used by Mayhew (2002) in the existing literature.
The 2,914,515 quote pairs used in Section 3.3 correspond to 1,362,192 unique EuRex quotes.25
For each of the unique EuRex quotes we obtain a quote for the matching EuRex option without
EuWax competition such that the time di®erence between the two EuRex quotes is minimized.
Next, we introduce a ¯lter to reduce asynchroneity by eliminating all EuRex-EuRex quote pairs with
a time di®erence greater than ¯ve minutes. The ¯ltering procedure results in 769,575 quote pairs.
As before we eliminate all quote pairs, if at least one of the two options in the pair has less than
two weeks until maturity. This reduces the sample to 642,146 pairs. Finally, all pairs are excluded,
if the average daily trading volume during the sample month di®ers by more than 20%. The ¯nal
sample contains 561,578 quote pairs. For each quote pair we then compute the following measures:
percentage bid-ask spreads, ratio of the ask price of the EuRex option without EuWax competition
to the ask price of the EuRex option with EuWax competition, and time di®erence. As previously,
24 Since matches can have di®ering expiration dates in this analysis, average daily rather than
monthly volume is used because one of the two options in a match may expire during the observation
month. Among EuRex options without EuWax competition, multiple matches with di®erent EuRex
options (with EuWax competition) are allowed.
25 The number of EuRex-EuWax quote pairs is higher, since each EuRex option can be matched
with several competing EuWax options.
26we then compute daily averages of the above measures for each EuRex-EuRex option match. This
results in 19,118 daily observations of EuRex-EuRex option matches. We exclude DAX and Euro
Stoxx 50 put options as both have fewer than 50 daily observations. This reduces the number of
observations to 19,083.
Finally, we compute averages over underlying assets and option types, forming ten groups. As
shown in Table 12, the average time di®erence between matching quotes is 82 seconds. The ratio of
volume for options without EuWax competition to volume for options with EuWax competition is
close to one in all groups. The ask price ratio is larger than one in all groups. According to prior
literature such as Mayhew (2002) the latter result may bias us against ¯nding lower bid-ask spreads
for EuRex options with EuWax competition. Nonetheless, we ¯nd that in six out of ten groups
bid-ask spreads for EuRex options with EuWax competition are signi¯cantly (1% level) lower than
the bid-ask spreads of their EuRex matches without EuWax competition. Only in one group is the
relation signi¯cant and reversed. The average bid-ask spread di®erence over all groups is 1.7% with a
maximum of 6.6% for Siemens put options. In general the results indicate that EuWax competition
indeed has a positive e®ect on the liquidity of EuRex options as measured by bid-ask spreads.
4.4.2 E®ect of EuRex Competition on EuWax Bid-Ask Spreads
This section analyzes the e®ect of competition from EuRex on EuWax bid-ask spreads. For each of
the 2,361 EuWax options, which have a competing EuRex option, we ¯nd matching EuWax options
which at no point during the sample period have a competing EuRex option, following the procedure
outlined in the previous section. For each of the 2,914,515 unique EuWax quotes used in Section 3.3
we obtain a quote for the matching EuWax option without EuRex competition such that the time
di®erence between the two EuWax quotes is minimized. We apply the same ¯ltering procedures and
compute daily averages as in the previous section resulting in 53,607 daily observations of EuWax-
EuWax matches. We exclude DAX, Euro Stoxx 50, and Siemens put options as they have fewer than
50 daily observations. This reduces the number of observations to 53,509.
Next, we compute averages over underlying assets and option types, forming nine groups. As
shown in Table 13, the time di®erence between quotes is somewhat larger than in the other two
matching procedures, but is still less than three minutes at 146 seconds. The ratio of volume for
EuWax options without EuRex competition to volume for EuWax options with EuRex competition
is close to one in all groups. Similarly, the ask ratio is larger than one in all groups except one,
which would again bias us against ¯nding lower bid-ask spreads for EuWax options with EuRex
competition.
In four out of nine groups bid-ask spreads for EuWax options with EuRex competition are
27signi¯cantly (1% level) lower than the bid-ask spreads of their EuWax matches without EuRex
competition. While we also ¯nd four groups for which the relation is signi¯cant (5% level or better)
and reversed, the magnitude of the spread di®erences is considerably larger for the cases which have
the predicted relation. In the cases where the EuWax spreads of options with EuRex competition
are lower, the di®erence ranges from .8% to 4.9%. On the other hand, the largest di®erence in the
reversed case is only .9%. The average bid-ask spread di®erence over all groups is lower for EuWax
options with EuRex competition at .6%. Since the results are biased against ¯nding lower spreads
for EuWax options with EuRex competitions, we recompute our tests (results not shown) using only
daily observations for which the di®erence of the ask prices is less than 50% of the ask price for the
option with competition. In this case, out of eight groups (across underlying and type) with more
than 50 observations, seven have lower bid-ask spreads for EuWax options with competition and are
signi¯cant at the 1% level or better. Thus, while the results are slightly weaker for EuWax options
than EuRex options, the evidence is generally supportive of the idea that EuRex competition has a
positive e®ect on the liquidity of EuWax options.
5. Conclusion
Option market structure matters. This paper provides evidence that it can be rational for two option
markets with fundamentally di®erent structures to exist side-by-side and to compete by o®ering
options with identical or similar characteristics. We motivate the above ¯nding by connecting the
idea of option market clienteles to market structure issues. The theoretical and empirical ¯ndings
highlight the importance of exercising great care when translating insights from the microstructure
literature on primary asset markets to derivative securities markets. Among other things we provide
further evidence that trading volume and bid-ask spreads may be less closely connected in derivatives
markets than in primary asset markets, and that the traditional components of bid-ask spreads may
also be less relevant for derivatives. As a new insight we show that unlike most primary asset
markets, derivatives markets may bene¯t from a certain type of fragmentation in that the absence
of standardized contracts and of a central counterparty fosters competition among issuers/liquidity
providers.
The results may also be of importance for regulators and practitioners. It appears that the
creation of bank-issued option markets in the U.S. could help serve the clientele of option investors
with a high probability of early liquidation, and if nothing else may also improve the quality of
existing markets such as the CBOE due to competition. Similarly, current discussions surrounding
a pan-European regulatory \securities passport" may consider bank-issued option regulation along
the lines of the German model.
28Several avenues for future research remain. For one, other measures of liquidity/market-making
quality, such as quoted depth, could be considered for a comparison of the two markets. With respect
to quoted depth, the clientele argument would predict that the EuRex market will be deeper than
the EuWax market, since depth is less of a concern for smaller investors using the EuWax market.
Bank-issued option markets also allow researchers a look at option demand functions, since issuers
are free to choose option characteristics which they expect to have high demand from investors.
In particular, issuance can be studied dynamically to investigate how it responds to events in the
underlying asset markets (e.g. issuing put options after large underlying price drops) and the markets
for already existing derivative securities. Similarly, there may be dynamic interaction among issuers
and markets with respect to both issuance and market-making behavior. This seems particularly
interesting in light of the fact that many bank option issuers are also exchange-issued option market
makers in the case of EuRex and EuWax.
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32Table 1: Institutional Di®erences between EuRex and EuWax
The table shows institutional di®erences between the EuRex and EuWax option markets.
Feature EuRex EuWax
Counterparty Central Di®erent Issuers
Market-Making Several Competing Issuer as Predominant
Market Makers Market Maker
Shorting Possible Not Possible
Market-Making Guarantees Same for All Market Makers Vary by Issuer
(e.g. trade size, depth)
Contract Design Standardized Chosen by Issuer
Creation of New Contracts Governed by Rules At Issuer's Discretion
33Table 2: Market Activity in the EuRex and EuWax Option Markets
The table shows the number of EuRex market makers/EuWax issuers, underlying assets, average time to expiration (in
days), and the mean, median, and standard deviation of the number of option contracts for EuWax and EuRex options
during the period 5/1/99 through 10/31/1. Contract numbers are broken down by option type, issuer, underlying
asset, and expiration date. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista.
EuRex EuWax
Call Put Call Put
Market Makers / Issuers 42 42 23 20
Underlying Assets 128 128 828 431
Mean 28 28 142 67
Underlying Assets per Market Maker / Issuer Median 16 16 132 44
St. Dev. 30 30 110 55
American 28,434 28,431 30,724 6,064
Option Contracts European 5,356 5,356 392 68
Total 33,790 33,787 31,116 6,132
Mean 1,353 307
Option Contracts per Issuer Median 1,214 299
St. Dev. 1,173 265
Mean 264 264 38 14
Option Contracts per Underlying Asset Median 224 224 8 3
St. Dev. 222 222 94 51
Mean 18.5 18.5 10.9 6.2
Expiration Dates per Underlying Asset Median 20.5 20.5 4.0 3.0
St. Dev. 7.8 7.8 17.2 9.5
Mean 3.2 2.2
Expiration Dates per Underlying Asset, Issuer Median 2.0 2.0
St. Dev. 2.7 1.5
Mean 152 152 453 409
Time to Expiration (in days) Median 88 88 455 416
St. Dev. 153 153 154 159
Mean 14.3 14.3 3.2 2.1
Strike Prices per Underlying, Expiration Date, Issuer Median 10.0 10.0 2.0 1.0
St. Dev. 12.2 12.2 3.1 2.7
34Table 3: Summary Statistics for Matched Eurex and Euwax Options
The table shows the number of observations, absolute value of expiration date di®erence, annual trading volume (in Euro million paid premia), strike price (mean,
standard deviation, minimum, maximum), expiration date (mean, minimum, maximum), contract size, Euwax minimum trade size, and ratio of Euwax and Eurex
trade size for a sample of matched pairs of Eurex and Euwax options during the year 2000. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike price,
expiration date, style. Category 2 is as catetgory 1 except § 7 days expiration date di®erence. Category 3 is as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for
index call options. All numbers are means unless indicated otherwise. Underlying assets are: Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax index,
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens. Simple and observation-weighted averages are also computed. Data on option characteristics and volume are from
Euwax, Eurex, and OnVista.
Deutsche Bank Daimler Chrysler Deutsche Telekom Siemens DAX Euro Stoxx 50 All Weighted
Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put
Obs. Total 191 30 189 47 224 44 280 48 1,010 4 279 15 2,361
Category 1 28 4 22 8 38 3 45 7 4 4 21 15 199
Category 2 163 26 167 39 186 41 235 41 898
Category 3 1,006 258 1,264
Exp. Date Di®. 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.0 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.2 2.4 0 1.7 0 2.6 2.8
Eurex Volume 1,419 194 445 441 1,502 487 1,310 153 7,307 14 5,261 581 1,593 4,223
Euwax Volume 108 4 340 5 264 37 521 17 4,059 64 60 0 456 1,867
Strike Mean 93 81 73 69 60 53 142 116 7,143 7,100 4,842 4,373 2,012
St.Dev. 17 12 18 17 24 15 40 35 1,125 115 900 555 239
Min. 50 60 40 40 26 26 60 60 4,000 7,000 3,000 3,200 1,464
Max. 140 100 120 100 140 80 250 180 10,000 7,200 7,000 7,000 2,526
Exp. Mean 8/7/1 8/21/1 5/17/1 3/24/1 7/10/1 4/11/1 7/26/1 6/22/1 2/27/1 9/21/1 4/28/1 12/12/1 6/26/1 5/2/1
Date Min. 3/17/0 6/16/0 3/17/0 3/17/0 3/17/0 3/17/0 3/17/0 3/17/0 1/21/0 9/21/1 3/17/0 6/15/1 6/11/0 2/27/0
Max. 12/20/2 12/20/2 12/20/2 6/21/2 12/20/2 6/21/2 12/20/2 12/20/2 6/21/2 9/21/1 6/21/2 6/21/2 8/28/2 9/2/2
Eurex Contr. Size 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 5 5 10 10 69 48
Euwax Contr. Size .21 .19 .18 .16 .25 .34 .24 .13 .01 .01 .01 .01 .14 .10
Euwax Trade Size 24 33 29 29 33 43 36 31 37 1 53 80 36 37
Rel. Size 5% 6% 5% 5% 8% 15% 9% 4% 7% 0% 3% 7% 6% 6%
35Table 4: Univariate Results for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), match category, number of daily observations, number of
quote pairs, average time di®erence, average ratio of ask prices, average ratio of bid prices, implied early liquidation
probability, and average bid-ask spread (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask) for a sample of matched quote pairs of
EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike price,
expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except § 7 days expiration date di®erence. Category 3 is as category
2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. Averages are calculated by ¯rst computing daily averages
of observed quotes for each EuRex-EuWax option pair. The daily observations are then averaged by underlying,
type, and match category. T-tests are computed for ask ratio (di®erent from 1), bid ratio (di®erent from 1), and the
di®erence of the bid-ask spreads (di®erent from 0). Insigni¯cant t-tests are indicated with #. T-tests are shown for the
di®erence of bid ratio and ask ratio (di®erent from 0). Simple and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures
are computed across all options in the sample. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista.
Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Underlying Type Match Daily Quote Time EuWax / EuRex Di®. Impl. BA Spread
Cat. Obs. Pairs Di®. Ask Bid t-Stat. Prob. EuWax EuRex
Deutsche Call 1 1,075 28,952 1:20 1.06 1.13 14.7 46% 4.8% 10.6%
Bank 2 7,979 196,781 1:13 1.02 1.09 49.1 24% 2.5% 8.2%
Put 1 27 401 1:33 1.06 1.10 2.2 62% #9.0% #12.4%
2 1,122 12,174 1:32 1.03 1.11 16.0 30% 6.2% 12.6%
Daimler Call 1 583 7,054 1:29 1.08 1.14 7.5 56% 10.5% 15.3%
Chrysler 2 7,219 76,358 1:35 1.09 1.16 31.8 55% 8.1% 13.8%
Put 1 162 2,818 1:15 #1.00 1.05 6.2 0% 4.8% 9.4%
2 2,790 26,874 1:28 1.04 1.10 24.8 42% 2.2% 7.3%
Deutsche Call 1 1,291 33,894 1:18 1.07 1.15 18.1 45% 7.0% 13.7%
Telekom 2 8,044 164,835 1:16 1.04 1.12 42.2 34% 6.2% 12.5%
Put 1 46 1,915 1:06 1.01 1.05 4.6 23% 5.5% 9.3%
2 2,857 111,250 1:04 1.02 1.08 27.5 26% 2.3% 7.3%
DAX Call 1 63 201 0:50 1.02 1.07 6.4 31% 0.3% 5.0%
3 43,069 1,903,803 0:39 1.05 1.09 66.8 55% 1.1% 4.6%
Put 1 47 303 0:38 1.02 1.05 2.7 40% 0.2% 2.9%
Euro Call 1 79 1,609 1:09 .98 #1.01 2.6 0% 3.2% 6.0%
Stoxx 50 3 7,500 212,871 1:08 1.05 1.09 29.4 56% 3.1% 6.5%
Put 1 55 1,363 0:58 .96 .98 2.3 0% 2.8% 4.8%
Siemens Call 1 943 14,815 1:15 1.02 1.07 12.9 27% 3.8% 8.0%
2 9,399 103,898 1:09 1.04 1.08 34.9 45% 2.1% 6.1%
Put 1 45 1,099 1:22 1.05 1.13 6.6 37% 2.6% 9.3%
2 1,171 11,247 1:20 1.05 1.10 12.7 52% 3.2% 7.5%
All 95,566 2,914,515 1:13 1.035 1.089 36% 4.2% 8.8%
All (Weighted) 95,566 2,914,515 0:59 1.047 1.099 47% 2.8% 7.1%
36Table 5: Univariate Results for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options by Quote Relation
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), match category, share of observations (in %), average ratio
of ask prices, average ratio of bid prices, and sum of all shares of observations for a sample of matched quote pairs
of EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike
price, expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except § 7 days expiration date di®erence. Category 3 is
as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. Quote pairs are categorized into four groups
according to the ratio of ask prices and the ratio of bid prices (observations with either ratio equal one are excluded).
Averages of all observed quote pairs are computed across underlying, type, match category, and ratio category. Data
on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 All
Underlying Type Match % Ask Bid % Ask Bid % Ask Bid % Ask Bid %
Cat. >1 >1 <1 >1 <1 <1 >1 <1
Deutsche Call 1 56 1.09 1.16 41 0.96 1.07 2 0.92 0.93 0 1.02 0.96 99
Bank 2 40 1.06 1.12 51 0.97 1.05 7 0.94 0.97 0 1.02 0.97 99
Put 1 87 1.08 1.12 11 0.98 1.06 0 0.94 0.83 99
2 55 1.09 1.16 35 0.97 1.07 9 0.87 0.91 0 1.06 0.94 99
Daimler Call 1 67 1.13 1.18 20 0.89 1.14 7 0.91 0.90 3 1.09 0.90 98
Chrysler 2 73 1.13 1.20 17 0.92 1.12 6 0.90 0.90 1 1.07 0.93 98
Put 1 41 1.04 1.07 44 0.96 1.06 10 0.93 0.95 1 1.04 0.98 96
2 67 1.07 1.12 28 0.97 1.06 4 0.94 0.96 0 1.02 0.99 99
Deutsche Call 1 74 1.10 1.18 23 0.94 1.11 2 0.92 0.93 0 1.07 0.95 99
Telekom 2 58 1.08 1.16 33 0.95 1.08 7 0.91 0.94 0 1.06 0.93 98
Put 1 43 1.03 1.07 44 0.98 1.04 10 0.97 0.99 1 1.01 0.99 97
2 33 1.05 1.10 59 0.98 1.05 7 0.97 0.98 0 1.02 0.98 99
DAX Call 1 77 1.05 1.10 18 0.98 1.04 5 0.95 0.99 100
3 84 1.06 1.10 14 0.97 1.05 2 0.90 0.91 0 1.07 0.94 99
Put 1 33 1.04 1.07 38 0.99 1.01 26 0.96 0.99 96
Euro Call 1 77 1.02 1.06 17 0.99 1.03 6 0.91 0.92 100
Stoxx 50 3 82 1.06 1.10 16 0.99 1.03 2 0.95 0.97 0 1.11 0.93 100
Put 1 22 1.01 1.03 60 0.99 1.01 18 0.94 0.96 100
Siemens Call 1 55 1.06 1.10 35 0.95 1.07 9 0.93 0.95 0 1.04 0.95 99
2 62 1.07 1.11 32 0.97 1.05 5 0.94 0.96 1 1.05 0.94 99
Put 1 88 1.05 1.13 11 0.96 1.11 0 0.98 1.00 99
2 67 1.08 1.13 28 0.97 1.07 3 0.94 0.95 0 1.11 0.92 100
Average 61 1.07 1.12 31 0.97 1.06 7 0.93 0.95 1 1.05 0.95 99
37Table 6: Multivariate Analysis Summary Statistics for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of quotes per month, match category, absolute
value of expiration date di®erence, ratio of ask prices, ratio of bid prices, number of competing EuWax options, ratio
of minimum trade size, EuWax maximum bid-ask spread (in Euro), a dummy equal to one for EuWax issuer being a
EuRex Market-Maker for the same underlying asset, annualized standard deviation of underlying asset returns during
the observation month, time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex option, and moneyness for a sample of matched quote
pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche
Telekom, Dax index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset,
type, strike price, expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except § 7 days expiration date di®erence.
Category 3 is as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. Number of observations is
shown and broken up by option type and underlying asset. For the ask and bid ratios monthly averages are calculated
from all observed quotes during the observation month for each EuRex-EuWax option pair. For time to expiration
and moneyness data is calculated daily, and then averaged over all observations during the month. Data on option
characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB. Daily data on
underlying asset returns and prices are from Datastream. All data is monthly. Sample period is the year 2000.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Mean SD Min Max
Quotes / Month 355 628 1 6,666
Match Category 2.5 0.6 1 3
Abs (Expiration Date Di®erence) 3.1 2.3 0 7
EuWax Ask / EuRex Ask 1.05 0.09 0.56 1.48
EuWax Bid / EuRex Bid 1.09 0.11 0.54 1.50
# Competing EuWax Options 2.7 1.6 1 8
Minimum Trade Size: EuWax / EuRex 2.6% 5.7% 0.0% 50.0%
EuWax Maximum Euro Spread 0.17 0.50 0.02 5
EuWax Issuer = EuRex Market Maker (=1) 0.59 0.49 0 1
Underlying Asset Standard Deviation 32% 14% 11% 77%
Time to Expiration 221 155 14 730
Moneyness 102% 26% 37% 347%





- Deutsche Bank 808
- Daimler Chrysler 892
- Deutsche Telekom 931
- DAX 3,444
- Euro Stoxx 50 915
- Siemens 1,195
38Table 7: Multivariate Results for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the coe±cient estimate, t-statistic, number of observations, and adjusted ¯t for regressions of ratio
of ask prices on ratio of bid prices, number of competing EuWax options, annualized standard deviation of underlying
asset returns during the observation month, option type, time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex option, moneyness, a
dummy (=1 for EuWax issuer being a EuRex Market-Maker for the matched option), EuWax maximum bid-ask spread
(in Euro), ratio of minimum trade size, underlying asset dummies, and issuer dummies using a sample of matched quote
pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche
Telekom, Dax index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, Siemens. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type,
strike, exp. date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except § 7 days exp. date di®erence. Category 3 is as category 2
except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. For the ask and bid ratios monthly averages are calculated
from all quotes during the observation month for each EuRex-EuWax pair. For time to expiration and moneyness
data is calculated daily, and averaged over all observations during the month. Data on option characteristics are from
EuWax, EuRex, OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax, KKMDB. Daily data on underlying asset returns and prices
are from Datastream. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and ¯rst-order serial correlation. All data is
monthly. Sample period is the year 2000.
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Variable Coe®. t-Stat. Coe®. t-Stat. Coe®. t-Stat.
Intercept .32 22.7 .32 21.1 .31 12.4
EuWax Bid / EuRex Bid .69 37.1 .68 36.3 .69 22.8
# Competing EuWax Options -.0027 -7.5 -.0027 -7.3 -.0048 -7.7
Underlying Asset Standard Deviation -.043 -10.8 -.030 -4.3 -.047 -4.9
Type (Put = 1) -.0085 -3.6 -.0047 -1.7 -.0086 -3.2
Time to Expiration -2.4E-05 -4.8 -1.9E-05 -3.6 9.0E-06 1.1
Moneyness .0055 0.6 .014 1.7 .0015 0.1
EuWax Issuer = EuRex Market Maker (=1) -.00029 -0.2
EuWax Maximum Euro Spread -.0059 -3.8
Minimum Trade Size: EuWax / EuRex -.12 -4.6
Deutsche Bank -.019 -10.6 -.014 -6.0
Daimler Chrysler -.0031 -0.9 -.0051 -1.2
Deutsche Telekom -1.2E-02 -3.5 -.0076 -2.0
Euro Stoxx 50 -5.0E-05 0.0 -.015 -4.9
Siemens .0028 1.2 .0033 1.2
Banque Nationale de Paris Paribas -.0098 -2.8 -.011 -3.1
Credit Lyonnais .028 2.5 .057 4.1
Commerzbank .0071 3.2 .0074 2.0
Deutsche Bank .00088 0.5 .0023 1.0
DG Bank .0040 2.2 .024 5.7
Dresdner Bank -.0069 -2.0 -.0043 -1.2
Goldman Sachs -.0013 -0.2 -.00062 -0.1
HypoVereinsBank -.00058 -0.2 .0063 1.5
Lehman Brothers -.0076 -1.1 .0062 0.8
Merrill Lynch .0059 0.6 .019 1.9
RaboBank .034 3.7 .027 4.9
Societe Generale .0075 3.7 .029 7.3
Sal. Oppenheim -.023 -7.2 -.025 -6.1
HSBC Trinkaus Burkhardt -.0023 -1.3 -.0023 -0.8
UBS Warburg -.0063 -2.2 .0045 0.9
Unicredito Italiano -.018 -3.1 .0049 0.8
Westdeutsche Landesbank -.0070 -1.2 .021 2.8
Observations 8,185 8,185 3,801
Adj. R2 73.1% 74.8% 74.8%
39Table 8: Time-Series Variation in Ask Ratios
The table shows the coe±cient estimate, t-statistic, estimated e®ect of a 1-month change in time to expiration on ask
ratios, and number of observations for regressions of ratio of ask prices on ratio of bid prices, number of competing
EuWax options, annualized standard deviation of underlying asset returns during the observation month, option type,
time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex option, moneyness, a dummy (=1 for EuWax issuer being a EuRex Market-
Maker for the matched option), EuWax maximum bid-ask spread (in Euro), ratio of minimum trade size, underlying
asset dummies, and issuer dummies using a sample of matched quote pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the
following underlying assets: Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx
50 index, Siemens. Match category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike, exp. date, style. Category 2 is as
category 1 except § 7 days exp. date di®erence. Category 3 is as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for
index call options. For the ask and bid ratios monthly averages are calculated from all quotes during the observation
month for each EuRex-EuWax pair. For time to expiration and moneyness data is calculated daily, and averaged over
all observations during the month. The sample is split by EuRex expiration dates. Data on option characteristics are
from EuWax, EuRex, OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax, KKMDB. Daily data on underlying asset returns and
prices are from Datastream. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and ¯rst-order serial correlation. All
data is monthly. Sample period is the year 2000.
EuRex Speci¯cation
Expiration Date 1 2 3
16/03/2001 Time to Expiration 1.1E-04 9.8E-05 1.1E-04
t-Statistic 2.1 3.8 3.7
1-Month E®ect 0.34% 0.30% 0.34%
Observations 909 909 909
15/06/2001 Time to Expiration 7.1E-05 6.7E-05 6.9E-05
t-Statistic 5.7 5.5 5.4
1-Month E®ect 0.21% 0.20% 0.21%
Observations 1,491 1,491 1,482
21/09/2001 Time to Expiration 1.6E-04 1.7E-04 1.7E-04
t-Statistic 3.5 3.0 3.9
1-Month E®ect 0.48% 0.50% 0.51%
Observations 418 418 408
21/12/2001 Time to Expiration 9.8E-05 9.0E-05 9.6E-05
t-Statistic 4.0 4.5 3.9
1-Month E®ect 0.29% 0.27% 0.29%
Observations 759 759 747
21/06/2002 Time to Expiration 3.1E-04 3.1E-04 3.0E-04
t-Statistic 3.8 4.1 3.8
1-Month E®ect 0.92% 0.93% 0.90%
Observations 255 255 255
40Table 9: Probability of Early Liquidation
The table shows the coe±cient estimate, t-statistic, mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, number of obser-
vations, and adjusted ¯t for a regression of probability of early liquidation cut-o® (PELC) on option omega, ratio of
option vega to EuWax ask, option type, time to expiration (in days) of the EuRex option, and EuWax market share
using a sample of matched quote pairs of EuRex and EuWax options on the following underlying assets: Deutsche
Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, Siemens. Match category 1
has the same underlying asset, type, strike, exp. date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except § 7 days exp. date
di®erence. Category 3 is as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call options. PELC is computed
from ask ratios and bid ratios. For the ask and bid ratios monthly averages are calculated from all quotes during
the observation month for each EuRex-EuWax pair. Omega is computed as delta times the ratio of the value of the
underlying to the EuWax ask price. Omega, vega, time to expiration, underlying value, and EuWax ask price are
calculated daily, and averaged over all observations during the month. Market share is computed as the ratio of EuWax
monthly trading volume to the sum of EuRex and EuWax monthly trading volume. Data on option characteristics
and volume are from EuWax, EuRex, OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax, KKMDB. Daily data on underlying
asset returns and prices are from Datastream. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and ¯rst-order serial
correlation. All data is monthly. Sample period is the year 2000.
Variable Coe±cient t-Statistic Mean SD Min Max
Intercept 0.150 16.1
Omega 0.008 7.5 6.9 6.3 .8 80.1
Vega / EuWax Ask 1.437 11.6 .038 .047 0 .527
Type (Put = 1) -0.048 -4.0 0.08 0.27 0 1
Time to Expiration 5.0E-04 20.0 224 156 14 730
Market Share -.015 -1.6 0.21 0.33 0 1
Observations 7,484
Adj. R2 19.2%
41Table 10: E®ective Spreads for Matched EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), match category, number of observations, average time di®erence,
average quoted bid-ask spread (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask), average e®ective bid-ask spread (ratio of absolute
di®erence between transaction price and mid quote to ask price times two), and share of inside-the-quote transaction
prices for a sample of matched quote/transaction pairs of EuRex and EuWax options during the year 2000. Match
category 1 has the same underlying asset, type, strike price, expiration date, style. Category 2 is as category 1 except
§ 7 days expiration date di®erence. Category 3 is as category 2 except di®erence in style is allowed for index call
options. Simple and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures are computed across all options in the sample.
Data on option characteristics are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote and transaction data are from EuRex,
EuWax and KKMDB.
Under- Type Match Obs. Time Di®erence Spread Share of
lying Cat. Trans- Trans./Quote Quoted E®ective Inside Trans.
actions EuRex EuWax EuRex EuWax EuRex EuWax EuRex EuWax
Deutsche Bank C 2 39 24:28 01:55 03:21 8.8% 4.0% 4.9% 3.3% 71.8% 12.8%
Daimler C 1 13 20:31 02:51 03:30 21.9% 10.9% 12.9% 8.0% 84.6% 23.1%
Chrysler 2 102 18:08 02:50 03:28 11.7% 8.3% 6.5% 6.3% 74.5% 8.8%
P 2 17 20:14 02:48 04:15 9.5% 5.0% 5.6% 4.4% 64.7% 5.9%
Deutsche C 1 19 21:49 03:43 03:17 10.7% 5.8% 5.6% 4.9% 73.7% 10.5%
Telekom 2 87 19:56 02:19 03:56 10.9% 7.2% 5.6% 4.9% 73.6% 26.4%
P 2 22 24:23 03:07 04:21 11.2% 10.1% 6.8% 5.1% 68.2% 63.6%
DAX C 3 840 15:20 01:49 02:20 7.1% 2.3% 3.7% 1.6% 70.8% 23.3%
Euro Stoxx 50 C 3 51 21:21 01:47 03:28 7.5% 4.0% 3.2% 3.6% 84.3% 3.9%
Siemens C 2 61 20:03 01:46 03:22 12.1% 4.0% 7.1% 3.1% 75.4% 16.4%
P 2 10 08:25 01:32 03:02 5.6% 3.9% 4.0% 3.2% 70.0% 30.0%
All 1,261 19:31 02:24 03:29 10.6% 5.9% 6.0% 4.4% 73.8% 20.4%
All (Weighted) 1,261 16:57 02:00 02:46 8.3% 3.6% 4.4% 2.6% 72.2% 21.3%
42Table 11: Transaction Costs for EuRex and EuWax Options
The table shows EuWax option price (in Euro), number of EuRex contracts, trade value (in Euro), EuRex transaction
costs (in Euro), EuWax transaction costs (in Euro), and the di®erence of EuWax and EuRex transaction costs as a
percentage of the trade value for three brokerages, Comdirect, Consors, and Fimatex. Contract size for EuWax and
EuRex options is .01 Euro and 5 Euro per index point, respectively. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax,
EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB. Transaction cost data are from Comdirect, Consors,
and Fimatex. Sample period is the year 2000.
Transaction Costs
EuWax # EuRex Trade Comdirect Consors Fimatex
Price Contracts Value EuRex EuWax Di®. EuRex EuWax Di®. EuRex EuWax Di®.
1 525 19 1 3.4% 20 10 1.8% 13 9 0.7%
1.05 10 5,250 45 11 0.7% 39 18 0.4% 50 9 0.8%
100 52,500 450 105 0.7% 275 69 0.4% 500 42 0.9%
1 2,380 19 5 0.6% 24 11 0.6% 13 9 0.1%
4.76 10 23,800 45 48 0.0% 131 65 0.3% 50 19 0.1%
100 238,000 450 476 0.0% 1,202 69 0.5% 500 47 0.2%
1 3,830 19 8 0.3% 31 15 0.4% 13 9 0.1%
7.66 10 38,300 45 77 -0.1% 204 69 0.4% 50 31 0.1%
100 383,000 450 766 -0.1% 1,927 69 0.5% 500 47 0.1%
1 9,505 19 19 0.0% 60 29 0.3% 13 9 0.0%
19.01 10 95,050 45 190 -0.2% 488 69 0.4% 50.0 47 0.0%
100 950,500 450 1,901 -0.2% 4,765 69 0.5% 500 47 0.0%
43Table 12: E®ect of EuWax Competition on EuRex Bid-Ask Spreads
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom, Dax
index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), number of daily observations, average time di®erence, average
volume ratio, average ratio of ask prices, and average bid-ask spreads (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask), and t-statistics
for the di®erence of the average bid-ask spreads for a sample of matched quote pairs of EuRex options with competition
from EuWax options and EuRex options without competition from EuWax options during the year 2000. EuRex-EuRex
quote pairs are generated by starting with a set of EuRex option quotes which have matching quotes from competing
EuWax options. The EuRex quotes are matched to EuRex quotes for options without EuWax competition such that
the matching EuRex option has the same type and underlying and comparable trading volume (as measured by paid
premia) during each observation month. Averages are calculated by ¯rst computing daily averages of observed quotes
for each EuRex-EuRex option pair. The daily observations are then averaged by underlying and type. Simple and
daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures are computed. Data on option characteristics are from EuWax,
EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Underlying Type Daily Time No EuWax Comp. / Bid-Ask Spread
Obs. Di®. EuWax Comp. EuWax No EuWax t-Stat.
Volume Ask Comp. Comp.
Deutsche Bank Call 1,540 1:16 .98 1.3 9.6% 13.9% 10.3
Put 528 1:06 .99 4.0 14.6% 14.8% .4
Daimler Chrysler Call 1,608 1:19 1.00 2.3 18.3% 16.9% (2.7)
Put 1,051 1:24 .98 1.0 9.8% 11.4% 4.3
Deutsche Telekom Call 2,641 1:18 .99 2.5 14.9% 14.7% (.5)
Put 1,420 1:13 .99 1.6 8.3% 10.2% 7.3
DAX Call 6,452 1:27 .99 2.4 6.9% 9.5% 15.4
Euro Stoxx 50 Call 1,957 1:17 .98 1.8 7.8% 7.9% 0.4
Siemens Call 1,549 1:33 .98 1.2 9.3% 12.5% 7.4
Put 337 1:33 .99 1.1 7.6% 14.2% 7.0
All 19,083 1:21 .99 1.9 10.7% 12.6%
All (Weighted) 19,083 1:22 .99 2.0 10.0% 11.7%
44Table 13: E®ect of EuRex Competition on EuWax Bid-Ask Spreads
The table shows the type (call or put), underlying asset (Deutsche Bank, Daimler Chrysler, Deutsche Telekom,
Dax index, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, and Siemens), number of daily observations, average time di®erence,
average volume ratio, average ratio of ask prices, and average bid-ask spreads (ratio of (ask minus bid) to ask), and
t-statistics for the di®erence of the average bid-ask spreads for a sample of matched quote pairs of EuWax options
with competition from EuRex options and EuWax options without competition from EuRex options during the year
2000. EuWax-EuWax quote pairs are generated by starting with a set of EuWax option quotes which have matching
quotes from competing EuRex options. The EuWax quotes are matched to EuWax quotes for options without EuRex
competition such that the matching EuWax option has the same type and underlying, and comparable trading volume
(as measured by paid premia) during each observation month. Averages are calculated by ¯rst computing daily averages
of observed quotes for each EuWax-EuWax option pair. The daily observations are then averaged by underlying and
type. Simple and daily-observation-weighted averages of all measures are computed. Data on option characteristics
are from EuWax, EuRex, and OnVista. Quote data are from EuWax and KKMDB.
Underlying Type Daily Time No EuRex Comp. / Bid-Ask Spread
Obs. Di®. EuRex Comp. EuRex No EuRex t-Stat.
Volume Ask Comp. Comp.
Deutsche Bank Call 6,763 2:26 .99 2.9 2.8% 1.9% (15.6)
Put 303 2:30 .96 9.3 5.7% 6.1% .5
Daimler Chrysler Call 4,751 2:28 .99 2.4 8.1% 7.7% (1.8)
Put 943 2:29 .99 2.1 2.5% 2.2% (3.7)
Deutsche Telekom Call 6,085 2:29 1.00 2.7 7.0% 6.4% (2.9)
Put 1,209 2:27 .99 .7 2.6% 7.5% 16.4
DAX Call 25,322 2:25 1.00 4.9 1.3% 2.2% 20.9
Euro Stoxx 50 Call 3,381 2:25 1.00 3.0 3.4% 7.2% 15.8
Siemens Call 4,752 2:28 1.00 2.4 2.8% 3.6% 6.5
All 53,509 2:28 .99 3.4 4.0% 5.0%
All (Weighted) 53,509 2:26 1.00 3.7 3.1% 3.7%
45